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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff,
-vs.THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and JAMES F. TAYLOR, and UNITED PARK CITY
MINES COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case
No.10219
)'

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a silicosis claim under the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law (herein called the "0. D. Law'')
for permanent total disability benefits. Defendant United Park City Mines Company (herein called ''defendant
employer") and plaintiff are in dispute as to which of
them has the obligation to pay whatever benefits defendant James F. Taylor, (herein called "defendant Taylor")
is entitled to receive. Defendant employer joins plain1
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tiff, however, in plaintiff's assertion that defendant Taylor failed to file his claim within the period provided :by
Section 35-2-48 U.C.A., 1953, the limitations of· actions
statute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Taylor was employed by defendant ·elh~
ployer as an underground miner for about 15 years be~
ginning in 1925. Thereafter (except for a two year hiatus
between July, 1952 and October of 1954), he was eni~
ployed as a watchman on the surface from 1945 until
June 30, 1961. He ret:urned to work, as a substitute for
a sick watchman, for the period from February 3 through
February 8, 1962. During that six days in February,
he did exactly the same work he had done for twenty
years before his 1961 separation from employment, and
he was then exposed to the same dust conditions as had
prevailed during his previous employment in surface
activity (R-77, 79). Furthermore, he was as capable of
the necessary physical exertion in February of 1962 as
he had been the previous June. In February, he fired the
boiler every day (R-80) and performed every other duty
of a watchman. There was no appreciable change in his
condition between July of 1961 and February of 1962
(R-103) or, indeed, between the end of 1959 and the date
of termination of his employment (R-81, 83, 103).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT TAYLOR FAILED TO FILE
HIS SILICOSIS CLAIM WITHIN ONE YEAR
AFTER HIS CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY,
AROSE.

2
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·.... Defendant employer fully concurs with plaintiff's
argument under its Point I. Section 35-2-48 U.C.A., 1953,
requires that a sili~osis claim be filed within one year
after the cause arises. If the Court adopts the most liberal view of when a cause of action arises, it must still,
o.n the record in this case, p·erceive that defendant Taylo~'s cause of action was mature and complete by the
en~ of 1959, and he then knew or should have known of
t~~ existence of every element of his cause of action :
·:, 1. Defendant Taylor knew that he had silicosis.

He testified (R-82) that Dr. Barta told him
he had silicosis in 1933; Dr. Openshaw told
him he was silicotic in 1943 or 1944 (R-82),
and Dr. Oniki similarly diagnosed his condition in 1952.
2. Defendant Taylor knew he was disabled by the
end of 1959.
He testified about his disabling symptoms as
follows (R-81) :

"Q. And did that condition - shortness of
breath, and tendency to fatigue - become
worse, or was it a fairly static condition 1
''A. It became worse at times.
'' Q. As time went on, it became worse~
''A. Yes.
''Q. Would you say that by the time you went to
work for the Judge Daly Mine, .or the Daly
Judge Mine, it had gotten about as bad as
it. got 1
''A. Well, it got a little worse after the last years
there.
3
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'' Q. The last year or two f
''A (nodding head in the affirmative.)

"Q. But it was very difficult for you to carry on
the work during the last, oh, from 1959 on;
is that correct f"
and {R-83):

"Q. Why did you leave work on June 30th of
1961f
"A. I was laid off.
"Q. Your condition at that time was about the
same as it had been for a year or so previously; is that correct f
"A. I'd say that, yes."
3. Defendant knew that the cause of his symptoms
was silicosis.
He testified he had been told three times that
he had silicosis, and his symptoms were the
classic symptoms of silicosis - well known
to all who live in hard rock mining communities.
There is absolutely no evidence of any appreciable
change in defendant Taylor's condition after 1959. The
Panel has found that he is now totally disabled, and
the members would undoubtedly have reached the same
conclusion in 1959 by which time all his present symptoms
had fully developed and he had suffered from silicosis for
twenty-five years of which he was aware. We know
(R-23, 30) that the Panel found no change in the lung
condition between September 29, 1962, and !{arch 23,
4
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1963. Since the symptomatology had been static for
several years, we must assume the disease process had
been as static during those years as it was for the six
months before March 23, 1963.
We do not believe the mere fact defendant Taylor
worked after 1959 demonstrates that he was not disabled
or even totally disabled before that time. The Panel's
conclusion of total disability is based upon the evidence
of sufficient pathology (obviously present in this case by
the· end of 1959) to contraindicate employment. The
panel members do not conclude that Mr. Taylor's performance of the duties of a watchman is now a physical
impossibility, they merely conclude that any substantial
physical exertion by him is medically unwise.
POINT II.
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND MUST RESPOND, IF COMPENSATION IS PAYABLE
ON THIS CLAIM, AS THE COMPENSATION
CARRIER FOR THE EMPLOYER AT THE
TIME OF LAST EXPOSURE.
The Commission found, with reference to the exposure during February of 1962, as follows :
'' * * * Under the principles enunciated in Pacific
Employers Insurance Company v. Industrial
Commission, 157 P. 2d Page 600, there must be
a causal relation between the applicant's elisability due to silicosis and his employment during
the policy period covered by The State Insurance
Fund. Since we have found that the applicant was
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide
dust during the period between February 3, 1962,

5
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and February 8, 1962, inclusive, the aforementioned case has been satisfied. Therefore, the applicant is entitled to an award for total and permit~
nent disability due to silicosis against The State
Insurance Fund.''
Plaintiff now contends it is an error of law for the.
Commission to impose liability upon a carrier in a silicosis case unless the carrier had been "on the risk" for
a period of thirty days during which the employee was
harmfully exposed to silicon dioxide dust. Plaintiff bases
its contention on Section 35-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, and particularly the following language:
'' * * * In the case of silicosis the only employer
liable shall be the employer in whose employment
the employeH was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of such disease, provided that in the case
of silicosis the only employer liable shall be the
employer in whose employment the employee was
last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide (Si02) dust during a period of 30 days or more
after the effective date of this act."

Obviously, that language does not say anything about
which of the two carriers, where there is a successor car-.
rier during the period of exposure, must respond when
an employee develops silicosis. Plaintiff asks this Court
to read into the section enough additional language so
that the protection it gives to employers is also extended
to insurance companies. The language this Court would
have to read into the section 'vould almost double its
length. There is no precedent for such monumental judiciallegisla tion.
6
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The legislative purpose in making liable only the last
employer during 30 days of harmful exposure is not evident from the words of the statute .or its legislative history. It cannot be assumed, however, that the legislature believed a 30 day exposure- would produce or significantly effect the course of the disease.· If this Court can
judicially notice any medical doctrine, it can take notice
that the disease of silicosis develops only after years of
exposure. The real purposes hoped to be accomplished
by Section 35-2-14 were
1. to encourage mining companies to eliminate dust
from their mines within the statutory period
(originally 60 days), and
2. to eliminate the economic drain which would beentailed if a mining company had to wait until
it had investigated the health of an applicant for
employment before it could risk hiring him and
putting him to work.
Neither of these reasons has the slightest application
to insurance carriers. To apply Section 35-2-14 to insurance carriers would lead to a ridiculous result in any
number of entirely probable situations. Suppose, for instance, that an employer, then insured by a private carrier, employs a silicotic for the first time on November
15~· He works underground in dusty environment for
thirty consecutive days. On December 1, however, the
employer's policy expires, and he then insures with the
State Insurance Fund. The silicotic becomes disabled
on December 16. Who, under the plaintiff's theory, must
7
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respond~

Plaintiff apparently believes the employer
should pay the benefits and the two insurance carriers
should be entirely relieved of responsibility, even though
the employer was always insured as the law requires and
even if the employer were insolvent and unable to pay
such benefits.
The plaintiff cites the Deza case (Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Comm.ission, 108 Utah 123) as authority for
the proposition we now criticize. We submit that the
Deza case says plainly and without equivocation that the
carrier who must respond (where there have been two
or more carriers on the risk during the period of exposure) is the one who insures the employer ''on. the
date'' of last harmful exposure. On page 124, the Court
makes this statement:
''From the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen
that the· last exposure to silicon dioxide dust was
June 7, 1943. The significant importance of this
date will become apparent immediately.'' (Our
emphasis.)
Again, on page 128, the Court says this :
''As ha.s been pointed out, however, June 7, 1943,
w·a~s the date of the la.st exposure of the applicant
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, and
from that date until his employment ceased because of total disability on March 25, 1944, he continued in the employ of the Mines Company but in
the capacity of a watchman above ground on the
property of the Company. The insurance carrier
at the time of such la.st exposure was the State Insurance Fund; this is the date \Yhich fixes thelia-
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bility of the employer, and consequently also attaches the liability to the employer's insurance
carrier as of that date.'' (Our emphasis.)
Plaintiff cites the Deza case as being authority for
the proposition that some causal relationship between
exposure while a carrier is on the risk and the employer's
disability must be shown if the carrier is to be held responsible. We submit that every day of an employee's
exposure to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust is
as significant in the total picture as every other day. The
necessary causal relationship is shown by the mere fact
that the exposure is to silicon dioxide dust and harmful.
The reason the insurance carrier was exonerated in
the Deza case was that the court clearly found that
there was no harmful exposure while that carrier
(Pacific Employers) was on the risk. In the instant case,
the Commission has found that the exposure during seven
days while plaintiff was on the risk was harmful. The
carrier with the coverage for the employer who is liable
on the date of the employee's last exposure in that employer's employment is, under the doctrine of the Deza.
case, the carrier who must respond. In this case, that
carrier was plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. ALLEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defenda.n.t
United Pa.rk City Mines Co.
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